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18 NOVEMBER 1980

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
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HR70-14
DATE:
04-26-2012

**Strategic
Warning
Staff**

SPECIAL REPORT

USSR-POLAND:

**A NEW SENSE OF URGENCY AND
THE POTENTIAL IMPACT ON SOVIET PLANS**




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Information**

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USSR-POLAND: A New Sense of Urgency and the
Potential Impact on Soviet Plans

Regular reporting on the political situation in Poland and the Alert Memoranda concerning the crisis have already alerted US policymakers to be prepared for a possible Soviet intervention.

[REDACTED]

As Soviet leaders lose confidence in the Polish regime and armed forces, Moscow may feel pressured to react rapidly and forcefully. The Soviets are likely to place heavy emphasis on the need for complete tactical surprise if an invasion under these circumstances is to be launched at all.

[REDACTED]

1. The unrest in Poland is of intense interest and importance to the Soviet Union and its leading East European clients. Since late summer, the USSR has carefully maintained a full range of options in response to the upsurge of the free trade union movement throughout Poland, from upgrading its military posture in the region to professing full confidence in the new Kania regime in Warsaw. [REDACTED]


2. The USSR and its allies may now be losing confidence, however, that the present Polish leadership is either able or willing to take needed steps to reverse the "antisocialist" tide. Signs that the Polish government and armed forces are preparing for a possible national emergency resulting from renewed large-scale strike activity might constitute further evidence in Soviet eyes that the prospects for a satisfactory outcome are worsening rather than improving, and that the chances are increasing that "disloyal" Polish troops will heavily resist any Soviet intervention in the crisis. Such awareness would lend Soviet deliberations over Poland a new sense of urgency. [REDACTED]

This special report is the product of the Strategic Warning Staff and has not been coordinated with the rest of the intelligence community. Comments were solicited and incorporated at the discretion of the Strategic Warning Staff. Questions or comments on this report should be addressed to the Director, Strategic Warning Staff.


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[REDACTED]



4. There are recent signs that Moscow's European allies also view the Polish situation with growing unease. Exchanges among East European leaders have picked up, with the Czechs apparently taking the lead. Following a trip to East Germany by Czech Foreign Minister Chnoupek on 4 November and a visit to Bulgaria by Czech Premier Strougal on 10-11 November, Hungarian party First Secretary Kadar arrived in Bratislava on 12 November for an unscheduled meeting with Czech party chief Husak. The joint communique issued after their talks stressed the theme of solidarity with "Polish Communists" now facing not only an "onslaught of antisocialist forces" but "attempts by international imperialism to interfere in Poland's internal affairs." 



6. At the same time, there are continuing indications of strenuous effort to stabilize the situation in Poland. Foremost among these is the decision issued by the Polish Supreme Court on 10 November allowing the registration of the free trade union organization, Solidarnosc, on terms acceptable to the movement's leaders. Soviet media coverage of the latest developments has remained unemotional and largely upbeat, avoiding direct reference to the new union. 



[Redacted]

7. But many Poles seemingly remain unconvinced that the worst is behind them.

[Redacted]

In this already uncertain atmosphere, Soviet concerns will only be fueled by such indicators as prominent Western press reports that popular support for the Communist Party in Poland has declined drastically and that mass resistance to any Soviet invasion is already being prepared.

[Redacted]

8. Looking to the weeks and months ahead, it is clear that the continuing downspin of the Polish economy makes the satisfaction of many of the basic grievances voiced by the union movement increasingly unlikely. A national congress of Solidarnosc is scheduled to convene in mid-December with the formal task of assessing the regime's compliance with the accords reached last September. If the government's performance at that point is found wanting, renewed resort to large-scale strike threats may be the result. The Communist Party in Poland, for its part, will soon be deeply embroiled in preparations for its "extraordinary" Ninth Congress, with numerous political careers as well as concrete issues at stake. An already floundering party will hardly be capable of reasserting its role in resolving basic social and economic conflicts if it remains unable to master itself. Worst of all, the responsiveness of the Polish armed forces to the regime's commands evidently can no longer be taken for granted.

[Redacted]

9. Knowledge of these symptoms of decay almost certainly affects Soviet confidence that the Polish leadership is capable of resolving the current conflict on terms compatible with Moscow's interests. This perception may put Soviet leaders under increased pressure to reach a final decision over how to deal with the Polish challenge in the near term, apart from any new turn of events in Poland

[Redacted]

10. With Moscow increasingly suspecting that personnel and perhaps entire units of the Polish armed forces would not support the regime against the strikers and might even resist a Soviet invasion, the USSR may put heavy emphasis on the need for complete tactical surprise if a military intervention is to be launched at all.

[Redacted]

a move, Moscow would rely on the demoralizing and disorganizing effect of a blitzkrieg-style operation, using mobility and the shock effect of the sudden appearance of an invading army to compensate for any lack of overwhelming troop strength.

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

11. An intelligence judgment regarding overall Soviet intentions toward Poland remains difficult. The deteriorating situation there, however, will clearly have a substantial impact. If the USSR has already decided that a military solution is unavoidable and that only the timing of such a move remains a question, awareness that the resistance is gathering strength would surely advance Moscow's plans considerably. If, on the other hand, the Soviets have not yet agreed among themselves that an invasion of Poland is the only alternative, indications of likely Polish resistance would almost certainly have a galvanizing effect on the Politburo, creating a strong sense that a fundamental decision must be made sooner rather than later. [Redacted]

12. The Soviets would almost certainly be confident that they could meet the diplomatic costs of a Polish invasion, including massive but perhaps temporary disruption of European detente. They may be less certain about accepting the military costs of the operation, including the possibility that a bloody invasion followed by imposition of an occupation-style regime might significantly curtail Soviet military options elsewhere. Soviet leaders must also be aware that an invasion of Poland would cause massive economic disruption throughout Eastern Europe and would even affect the USSR. Yet none of these factors would be likely to deter the Soviets from invading once they had concluded that the situation in Poland had gotten out of control. [Redacted]

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
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ANNEX



CZECHOSLOVAKIA

-- [redacted] in September 1980 [redacted]
[redacted] were called up without prior notice to
participate in a military exercise. This call-up was supposedly in
preparation for actions concerning Poland. [redacted]

-- [redacted] on 4 November the military compound
in Bruntal, Czechoslovakia (which includes the headquarters of the Soviet
31st Tank Division) was empty. [redacted] the troops ordinarily
stationed there had been transferred to the Czech-Polish border and that
the woods along the border were "crawling with" Soviet soldiers and tanks.
[redacted] the Soviet "tent city" formerly located outside
of Prague was now located at an unidentified point along the Polish border.
[redacted]

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USSR

-- Interpretable imagery of Poland and the three western Soviet military districts continues to be scarce primarily because of cloud cover in the area. Coverage of 11 and 13 November 1980, however, indicated increased activity levels at installations of the 51st GMRD, 13th Army. The majority of the units had departed or were in the process of departing the installation, on 13 November 1980. (TS RUFF)

-- On 11-12 November, while passing through Brest--a major transportation junction in the Belorussian Military District--the West German military attache saw an estimated 2000 Soviet military personnel, of mixed services and branches and clearly not recent draftees, apparently headed for East Germany by rail. (C)

-- Sigint tenuously suggests that Soviet Chief of the General Staff, Marshal Ogarkov, may have gone to Poland on 15 November. The Soviet General Purpose Transport Unit TU-134 (CRUSTY), usually associated with Ogarkov's movements, made a roundtrip flight from Moscow to Krzywa, Poland, not far from HQS NGF, between approximately 0700 and 1300 on that date. There were, however, none of the accompanying VIP communications usually associated with Ogarkov's travels. (TS UMBRA)



Soviet Forces Opposite Poland



	Peacetime deployment area, Soviet armies bordering Poland
	Peacetime deployment area, other Soviet armies
	Tank division
	Motorized rifle division
	Military district boundary



Secret



LTIC

LENINGRAD

MOSCOW

Minsk
BELORUSSIAN

5th Guards
Tank Army

U. S. S. R.

26th Army

Brest

8th
Tank Army

Kiev

KIEV

13th Army

CARPATHIAN

38th Army

ODESSA

Odessa

Romania

Black Sea

0 200
Kilometers

Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative.

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